Other stuff

[MJW (ya that one)]

AfD got 27%. This might look bad, because Nazis won with 37%, but they were their best states and nationally it would only be 17%. Also far left would prop up the center parties for nothing (like V did in Sweeden) because time favors them due to demographics so AfD's target is 50%, not 37%.

[GeneralKilCavalry]

AfD got 27%. This might look bad, because Nazis won with 37%, but they were their best states and nationally it would only be 17%. Also far left would prop up the center parties for nothing (like V did in Sweeden) because time favors them due to demographics so AfD's target is 50%, not 37%.

This is going to be a huge hit for Die Linke, I fear. The vacuum left by the collapse or transition to milquetoast social democracy by most of the western european left has created a huge opening for parties like the AfD and Fidesz.

[ipecac]

The first thing we observe is a major transformation, a geopolitical and strategic re-composition. We are undoubtedly experiencing the end of Western hegemony over the world.

It's interesting that Macron is admitting this. But even more so is his motivation.

[darrelljs]

I'm reminded of an interesting paper by Robert Kagan...here's the opening paragraph:

It is time to stop pretending that Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world, or even that they occupy the same world. On the all-important question of power — the efficacy of power, the morality of power, the desirability of power — American and European perspectives are diverging. Europe is turning away from power, or to put it a little differently, it is moving beyond power into a self- contained world of laws and rules and transnational negotiation and cooperation. It is entering a post- historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity, the realization of Kant’s “Perpetual Peace.” The United States, meanwhile, remains mired in history, exercising power in the anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might. That is why on major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus: They agree on little and understand one another less and less. And this state of affairs is not transitory — the product of one American election or one catastrophic event. The reasons for the transatlantic divide are deep, long in development, and likely to endure. When it comes to setting national priorities, determining threats, defining challenges, and fashioning and implementing foreign and defense policies, the United States and Europe have parted ways.

Another quote:

World War II all but destroyed European nations as global powers, and their postwar inability to project sufficient force overseas to maintain colonial empires in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East forced them to retreat on a massive scale after more than five centuries of imperial dominance — perhaps the most significant retrenchment of global influence in human history.

His opinion is far from universally accepted, but it's true that Europe has had plenty of time to come to grips with the end of "their" hegemony, and it's caused a divergence in perspective.

Darrell

[ipecac]

The main point is good. The minor points (eg. "a post- historical paradise of peace and relative prosperity", "likely to endure") just haven't aged well.

but it's true that Europe has had plenty of time to come to grips with the end of "their" hegemony

Maybe Macron is finally coming to grips with the fact that making a European superpower (or even regional power) via the EU won't work.

[Charriu]

Very interesting paper, indeed. Yes, some things haven't aged well, but I just wanted to say that we still have peace in Europe and the paper is right in that it's also in the interest of USA that it stays that way. The main point that there is a divide between Europeans and Americans is certainly true. Every time I visit a fellow European nation I never feel that foreign there, but visiting the US I felt a certain cultural difference.

About Macron, I never had the feeling that he wanted to create a superpower, but rather fix some fundamental flaws and problems within the EU. Yes, he proposed a joint defensive organization between the EU members, but I always understood that as a way to better coordinate and finance all those armies. For example it's just more efficient to organize everything tank related under one organization then letting 28 organizations do the same.

[Mardoc]

If you define 'Europe' as the original EEC Countries, and maybe additionally the UK, then I can see that thesis making sense.  Even such a small step away as Spain, though, sets the whole timeline in doubt (they lost nearly their whole empire in the 1820's), let alone the majority of the continent that never had colonies (Ireland, the Soviet bloc, the Balkans, Scandinavia...).  And of course most everywhere east of Germany is still in the "anarchic Hobbesian world where international laws and rules are unreliable and where true security and the defense and promotion of a liberal order still depend on the possession and use of military might." Honestly, I'm not sure whether German security is more due to the US or due to Poland, Ukraine, etc.

[darrelljs]

Scandinavia

Who are we buying Greenland from again ?


Darrell

[ipecac]

Very interesting paper, indeed. Yes, some things haven't aged well, but I just wanted to say that we still have peace in Europe

Conflict is increasing.

About Macron, I never had the feeling that he wanted to create a superpower, but rather fix some fundamental flaws and problems within the EU. Yes, he proposed a joint defensive organization between the EU members, but I always understood that as a way to better coordinate and finance all those armies. For example it's just more efficient to organize everything tank related under one organization then letting 28 organizations do the same.

The proper end of this logic, based on ever-increasing 'efficiencies' and 'optimisations' is central government. Centralised economic policy, centralised law, soon-to-be centralised army.

[ipecac]

Russia appears post-imperial too, even though much of Europe is understandably still wary.