Chevalier Plays AGEOD Let's Play/AAR

[Chevalier Mal Fet]

Bonus video, since I had to cut either this or ABBA from the main post.

[DaveV]

Thanks for all these writeups, they've been well written and educational. One thing doesn't add up to me:

There are two small ridges - to the north, Mont St. Jean, to the south, La Belle Alliance - separated by about 1,500 yards, less than a mile. From Hougoumont in the west to the little village of Papelotte in the east it’s less than 5,000 yards, or three miles.

From the maps, the distances look roughly equal, not 3x longer on the east-west axis.

[Chevalier Mal Fet]

Thanks for all these writeups, they've been well written and educational. One thing doesn't add up to me:

There are two small ridges - to the north, Mont St. Jean, to the south, La Belle Alliance - separated by about 1,500 yards, less than a mile. From Hougoumont in the west to the little village of Papelotte in the east it’s less than 5,000 yards, or three miles.

From the maps, the distances look roughly equal, not 3x longer on the east-west axis.

You're right, it looks that way to me, too. I took the battlefield descriptions from David Chandler, but decided to verify it. Using Google Maps' distance measuring too, the distance from La Belle Alliance to the Lion's Mound, traditionally Wellington's headquarters:




1.5 kilometers, or near enough to 1500 yards as makes no difference. 

And the distance from the museum of Hougoumont to the village of Papelotte on the British left:




Here, only 3 km, significantly less than the stated 5,000 yards. Best guess is the cavalry flanks of the armies extended another thousand yards out from Hougoumont and from Papelotte? But yeah, the width of the battlefield is if anything narrower than what Chandler wrote.

[shallow_thought]

Thanks for all these writeups, they've been well written and educational.

 

My perspective does come overwhelmingly from British historians (and 'popular' ones such as Richard Holmes, not actual academic writing). This puts me well ahead of the uninformed Brit who doesn't actually realise that anyone except the British and French were present, but still has its biases. My memory of my reading agrees that it was certainly the arrival of the Prussians that turned a defensive success into a decisive rout, and it's clear that numbers would have been very different if Grouchy had been present, which could well have made a difference to a "close run thing". The extent to which the arrival of the Prussians actually turned the battle (that is, would Wellington still have held the field if neither Grouchy nor Blucher had arrived on the day) is a matter of debate ...

I can say that I can understand Wellington's instict to cling to a position that kept open the option of retreat to the coast, rather than committing to moving further inland. He wasn't a true coalition general (compare with Malborough) - working with the Portuguese had gone well (although treating them as a junior partner in their own country), but tactical cooperation with the Spanish had generally gone poorly - not exactly a trust-building experience. He was also not a politically independent war leader (such as Napoleon), and may have had a part of his mind on possible reactions at home if things went poorly (British politics were largely bloodless but extremely vicious - again, the example of Marlborough is informative, although a century earlier - and Wellington had strong family links to particular factions of the government although I'd have to look up who was actually in office at the time).

IIRC, his army was also a very mixed bag, both British and non-British. Some of the British units were veteran, but many of his best had been sent on a round trip accross the Atlantic (pointless, as it turns out - the war of 1812 was largely over before they got there), and a decent part of what he had available was green. The non-British troops also varied from excellent to borderline useless.

It would be an interesting exercise for a sufficiently powerful computer to analyse the outcome of a clash between similar numbers of Wellington's best army (around Vittoria?) against Napoleon's, with them both at their physical and mental peaks, assuming Wellington was allowed to pick a defensive position of his choice to give him a chance, but Waterloo is what we've got.

[Brian Shanahan]

I must add my voice to DaveV and Shallow_thought, these playthroughs and especially the history illustrations are very engaging and informative.

[Brian Shanahan]

Thanks for all these writeups, they've been well written and educational.

 

My perspective does come overwhelmingly from British historians (and 'popular' ones such as Richard Holmes, not actual academic writing). This puts me well ahead of the uninformed Brit who doesn't actually realise that anyone except the British and French were present, but still has its biases. My memory of my reading agrees that it was certainly the arrival of the Prussians that turned a defensive success into a decisive rout, and it's clear that numbers would have been very different if Grouchy had been present, which could well have made a difference to a "close run thing". The extent to which the arrival of the Prussians actually turned the battle (that is, would Wellington still have held the field if neither Grouchy nor Blucher had arrived on the day) is a matter of debate ...

I can say that I can understand Wellington's instict to cling to a position that kept open the option of retreat to the coast, rather than committing to moving further inland. He wasn't a true coalition general (compare with Malborough) - working with the Portuguese had gone well (although treating them as a junior partner in their own country), but tactical cooperation with the Spanish had generally gone poorly - not exactly a trust-building experience. He was also not a politically independent war leader (such as Napoleon), and may have had a part of his mind on possible reactions at home if things went poorly (British politics were largely bloodless but extremely vicious - again, the example of Marlborough is informative, although a century earlier - and Wellington had strong family links to particular factions of the government although I'd have to look up who was actually in office at the time).

IIRC, his army was also a very mixed bag, both British and non-British. Some of the British units were veteran, but many of his best had been sent on a round trip accross the Atlantic (pointless, as it turns out - the war of 1812 was largely over before they got there), and a decent part of what he had available was green. The non-British troops also varied from excellent to borderline useless.

It would be an interesting exercise for a sufficiently powerful computer to analyse the outcome of a clash between similar numbers of Wellington's best army (around Vittoria?) against Napoleon's, with them both at their physical and mental peaks, assuming Wellington was allowed to pick a defensive position of his choice to give him a chance, but Waterloo is what we've got.

On Wellington's knowledge of what British politics could do, he would have had first hand experience of what Parliament did to those it disliked or thought failed in from his time with the East India Company. While not a company servant at the same time as Warren Hastings, he did serve during Hastings' impeachment and would have been well aware of Robert Clive's fall from grace.

[chumchu]

Thank you for the great posts. This level of content is why I love this forum.

I think you did a great job of presenting a daunting material in an interesting and engaging form. I especially enjoyed your coverage of the later campaigns which I know less about and tend to get overlooked. The diagrams of the Autumn 1813 campaign was great because of the extreme simplification.

Have you thought about collecting the posts into something bigger?

[Cyneheard]

I must add my voice to DaveV and Shallow_thought, these playthroughs and especially the history illustrations are very engaging and informative.

Agreed. This has been a great series. Marshal Vorwärts indeed.

[Chevalier Mal Fet]

Thanks for all these writeups, they've been well written and educational.

 

My perspective does come overwhelmingly from British historians (and 'popular' ones such as Richard Holmes, not actual academic writing). This puts me well ahead of the uninformed Brit who doesn't actually realise that anyone except the British and French were present, but still has its biases. My memory of my reading agrees that it was certainly the arrival of the Prussians that turned a defensive success into a decisive rout, and it's clear that numbers would have been very different if Grouchy had been present, which could well have made a difference to a "close run thing". The extent to which the arrival of the Prussians actually turned the battle (that is, would Wellington still have held the field if neither Grouchy nor Blucher had arrived on the day) is a matter of debate ...

Personally, my own belief is that the Prussians saved the battle. If Napoleon had attacked a few hours earlier, before the Prussians could march the ten miles from Wavre, or if they hadn't come at all, I think he would have forced Wellington to retreat. The main thing is the moments right after La Haye Sainte fell - most of Wellington's force was on the right and his center was on the brink of collapse. But Napoleon had already sent IV Corps (10,000 fresh troops) and the Guard to try and hold off the Prussians. I suspect he wouldn't have thrown in the Guard, going from his behavior in earlier campaigns, most especially Borodino, but I DO THINK there was a better than even chance that he would have sent in IV Corps and it would have been decisive.

That's why he rated his chances at 90% in the morning - he didn't imagine there was any way the Prussians would intervene, and he knew he could beat the somewhat-shaky Anglo-Dutch army in a one-to-one battle. Even after the Prussians he still gave himself 60% odds, presumably because he was counting on Grouchy to be hot on their heels. I feel for all his optimism Napoleon probably understood his chances better than anyone else.

I must add my voice to DaveV and Shallow_thought, these playthroughs and especially the history illustrations are very engaging and informative.

Thank you! I really appreciate the feedback - it's hard to struggle on in silence, so I really like when people write back. I'm a history teacher by trade and would love to someday write a book of my own.

Thanks for all these writeups, they've been well written and educational.

I can say that I can understand Wellington's instict to cling to a position that kept open the option of retreat to the coast, rather than committing to moving further inland. He wasn't a true coalition general (compare with Malborough) - working with the Portuguese had gone well (although treating them as a junior partner in their own country), but tactical cooperation with the Spanish had generally gone poorly - not exactly a trust-building experience. He was also not a politically independent war leader (such as Napoleon), and may have had a part of his mind on possible reactions at home if things went poorly (British politics were largely bloodless but extremely vicious - again, the example of Marlborough is informative, although a century earlier - and Wellington had strong family links to particular factions of the government although I'd have to look up who was actually in office at the time).

On Wellington's knowledge of what British politics could do, he would have had first hand experience of what Parliament did to those it disliked or thought failed in from his time with the East India Company.  While not a company servant at the same time as Warren Hastings, he did serve during Hastings' impeachment and would have been well aware of Robert Clive's fall from grace.

And, of course, he was part of the trio of generals subject to a court of inquiry after the Convention of Cintra in 1808. His career survived but his two superiors did not. So Wellington always had politics at the forefront of his mind when conducting his campaigns, and his ability to navigate the complex Iberian political landscape was one of his better qualities as a general (I also think Wellington was a strong attacking general, and his reputation as a defensive fighter only is a bit overblown and unfair - he fought defensively because most of the time it was more effective but he could attack when needed, as at Rolica, Salamanca, and Vitoria).

Thank you for the great posts. This level of content is why I love this forum.

I think you did a great job of presenting a daunting material in an interesting and engaging form. I especially enjoyed your coverage of the later campaigns which I know less about and tend to get overlooked. The diagrams of the Autumn 1813 campaign was great because of the extreme simplification.

Have you thought about collecting the posts into something bigger?

I've thought about migrating most of this material to my blog, which I update very irregularly. Not sure what else I could compile it into - I make so much use of copywrighted material that I couldn't really convert it to a book, and besides there's not much demand for more books on Napoleon. I have nothing new to add to the subject, after all, just condensing, summarizing, and explaining what's already out there.

But someday, yes, I'd love to write for a wider audience!

I must add my voice to DaveV and Shallow_thought, these playthroughs and especially the history illustrations are very engaging and informative.

Agreed. This has been a great series. Marshal Vorwärts indeed.

Blucher is one of my favorite characters from this era. The old man had seemingly limitless energy and courage, and even though Napoleon got the better of him on the regular he always bounced back and came on again, which is why in the end he was the man leading the charge into Paris in both 1814 and in 1815.

[aetryn]

What happened to Cavalry after the Napoleonic Wars? Is this the last time we see this kind of combined arms charges where attacking cavalry force the infantry to form squares reducing their effectiveness against attacking infantry? Was it just that the rifle became better and more accurate and the horses tended to get shot to pieces at longer ranges? Cavalry in the American Civil War seem to be more light cavalry for scouting, pursuit, and harassment, but was that just because neither side had any heavy cavalry?