Bush Speaks to Canada

[Thecla]

I find your turn of phrase revelaing. We did not stop operating in Afghanistan since we added to the load in Central Command with the Iraq operation. We kept on operating, and are still operating.

I'm honestly baffled as to what part of what part of my turn of phrase in "The US did not abandon Afghanistan...If a fraction of the economic and military resources that went to Iraq had been devoted to Afghanistan, in addition to the resources that were provided things could have progressed there much more easily than they have..." reveals anything about the US stopping operations in Afghanistan.

As to the rest, we appear to agree that "perhaps" is true, not with your opener that Afghanistan has or had anything easy about it.

I did not mean to imply that Afghanistan is or was "easy" -- it's very difficult -- only that the diversion of attention and resources to Iraq has made it even more difficult.

Why do you assume I supported the war?

Are you saying you didn't support the war?

Blythe what? From what part of the article?

Wolfowitz: No, I think it happens to be correct. The truth is that for reasons that have a lot to do with the U.S. government bureaucracy we settled on the one issue that everyone could agree on which was weapons of mass destruction as the core reason, but -- hold on one second --

Yes, this is the quote I have in mind.

I find your summation to be an interestingly, and slanted version of what I read in that piece. A man hears what he want to hear, and disregards the rest. Lie, lie, lie.

As usual, you put down an assessment that is not in agreement with your own as due to bias and predjudice.

There is no question that WMD had a primacy in policy decisions, and in harnessing political emotion. The question is: was is self delusion, incompetence, or out right distortion? I wish I knew. I suspect the first two, but do not rule out the last. More facts needed.

There is no question that WMDs had primacy in harnessing political motivation, obtaining domestic support for the war, and providing an international justification; but it's not at all clear that it had primacy in policy making decisions (see the Wolfowitz quote).

This is old ground and I do not expect any more agreement from you on it now than earlier: but what is clear, and was clear long before the war began, is that, despite their words, the Bush administration's primary goal was not simply to destroy Hussein's WMDs, it was to remove his regime (for whatever reason). To justify this course of action, they exaggerated and distorted every bit of evidence they could lay their hands on about aluminum tubes, mobile bio labs, and all the rest of it. The CIA has taken the fall for the intelligence failures, but this war was one driven by politics from the start. What the policy discussions really were, how much was self-delusion and incompetence, and how much was deliberate distortion we don't know, but I believe (and it's my opinion, not proven fact) that at least some members of the administration used 9/11 very deliberately as a means of implementing their foreign policy objectives in Iraq.

International law is as strong as its enforcement.
Occhi

Yes indeed -- that's why it's more of a guidline really.

[Occhidiangela]

If a fraction of the economic and military resources that went to Iraq had been devoted to Afghanistan, in addition to the resources that were provided things could have progressed there much more easily than they have..." reveals anything about the US stopping operations in Afghanistan.

Assumption: the Iraq operation by its existence reduced the forces that would be commited to Afghanistan. I have already replied, based on my own operational experience, that your presumption is on shaky ground. One data point is the years long delay in putting navigational aids into Kandahar Airfield, and Bagram as well. There is a limit to what can be insterted and logistically supported into Afghanistan basedon the logistic footprint, and I repeat, on the political front. Part of the policy with regards to friendlies and neutrals there is keeping a low profile, and empowering local allies. The political will to build a bigger footprint, in the year and a half before the Iraq operation went live, was lacking then, and it is still lacking. I have seen this with my own eyes.

You seem to be making a hidden assumption that one can only do one major operation at a time, but I am not sure. I will state that what I infer from the decisions in Washington is an assumption that one can get a lot done "on the cheap" (not in raw terms, war is bloody expensive) but in relative terms. "How much can we accomplish for how cheap?" That is not in accord with the "Powell Doctrine" that informed our military political linkage for about 10 years.

Diversion of attention, agree, diversion of resources, addressed. It wasn't coming anyway, not as I saw it on the operational side.

Are you saying you didn't support the war?

My feeling at the time was "so be it, but I am not convinced there is not a third path." When the decision to go was made, I was still wondering "why now?" Since I was operating under the assumption that the WMD programs were in a more robust state than appears to have been the case, my feeling was "About damn time we quit fiddle farting around with Saddam." That has more to do with my disgust with 12 years of indecision and appeasement than with any convincing belief that going into Iraq and ripping out Saddam by the roots would make the Mid East security situation any better. It would just make it different.

There is no question that WMDs had primacy in harnessing political motivation, obtaining domestic support for the war, and providing an international justification; but it's not at all clear that it had primacy in policy making decisions (see the Wolfowitz quote).

We sorta agree. Having read the interview again, what I see is that the argument for war has a stool with three unequal length legs, maybe four. I do not believe that without the WMD leg Congressional support would have been won. The problem was, credible arguments contra were weak, (absence of evidence is not evidence of absense, so to speak) and based on a sustained pattern of incompetence and indifference by the UN Security Council, which includes the U.S. My opinion.

the Bush administration's primary goal was not simply to destroy Hussein's WMDs, it was to remove his regime (for whatever reason).

Correct, American policy since about 1998. Policy is hot air until action is put into it. Policy seems to have hit an opportunity, for better and for worse. In my case, the for worse meant I missed my family for six months.

To justify this course of action, they exaggerated and distorted every bit of evidence they could lay their hands on about aluminum tubes, mobile bio labs, and all the rest of it.

Right, my three cases above: self delusion, incompetence, deliberate falsehood. Or a combination of the three. In any case, as usual, decision made with imperfect information. When Secretary Powell briefed the UN, I believed him.

What the policy discussions really were, how much was self-delusion and incompetence, and how much was deliberate distortion we don't know, but I believe (and it's my opinion, not proven fact) that at least some members of the administration used 9/11 very deliberately as a means of implementing their foreign policy objectives in Iraq.

On that we agree: the emotional energy of 9-11 was used as a catalyst to garner support for the war, which was execution of a policy delayed, missing domestic support. When the giant awoke on 9-11, support became available.

Politics as usual, of which war is an expensive and gory subset.

Occhi

[Thecla]

You seem to be making a hidden assumption that one can only do one major operation at a time, but I am not sure...Diversion of attention, agree, diversion of resources, addressed. It wasn't coming anyway, not as I saw it on the operational side.

Well, I guess my hidden assumption was the the US really meant what it said when it went into Afghanistan: that it wasn't going to just leave after the invasion, but was going to provide all the resources necessary to stabilize and rebuild the country so it didn't pose a further threat. The fact that we didn't do this properly I put down to Iraq. But maybe those resources weren't coming anyway -- you certainly have much more direct knowledge of what happened in Afghanistan than I do.

[Occhidiangela]

Well, I guess my hidden assumption was the the US really meant what it said when it went into Afghanistan: that it wasn't going to just leave after the invasion, but was going to provide all the resources necessary to stabilize and rebuild the country so it didn't pose a further threat. The fact that we didn't do this properly I put down to Iraq. But maybe those resources weren't coming anyway -- you certainly have much more direct knowledge of what happened in Afghanistan than I do.

The problem with going into someone else's land and "sorting them out" is that no matter what you bring to the table,

It Was Not Invented Here

One has to have patience, time, and what some called a policy of constructive engagement. Your opponents for change have no such constraints. Their sole requirement is to show you as inneffective, wrong, bad, foolish, weak, or a variety of "negative" things that makes your already foreign approach less palatable.

In the long haul, I'd say that when someone discusses Afghanistan and the Hearts and Minds issue, they are on to the core matter. Don't alienate the traditional power base, they can start and re start a civil war, which creates insecurity and undermines reform. No amount of resources thrown at such a situation will succeed, since now you are in the civil war, having picked a side.

Don't alienate the average Joe. His support or at least neutrality is critical to achieveing whatever it is you want to achieve.

Show strength, patience, and will, to include good will.

None of that is necessarily a function of how many "resources" you commit other than the most critical: time. It is the kind and quality of the resource that makes the critical difference. Special Forces and the non military folks who interact with the folk of Afghanistan are the key catalysts to any political success we may eventually achieve. The normal military forces have a role that needs to be finite, in time and function. The Marines did incredible work in the Tarin Kowt bowl, with a small force and an innovative approach, but considerable of what they did was to bring the enemy to battle and defeat him. The real victory will come over time when the weekly firefights are no longer a routine occurrence.

Making more rubble, and making the existent rubble bounce, eventually gets to be old and counterproductive.

Occhi

[Ashock]

I'm honestly baffled as to what part of what part of my turn of phrase in "The US did not abandon Afghanistan...If a fraction of the economic and military resources that went to Iraq had been devoted to Afghanistan, in addition to the resources that were provided things could have progressed there much more easily than they have..." reveals anything about the US stopping operations in Afghanistan.



I did not mean to imply that Afghanistan is or was "easy" -- it's very difficult -- only that the diversion of attention and resources to Iraq has made it even more difficult.




Are you saying you didn't support the war?



Yes, this is the quote I have in mind.



As usual, you put down an assessment that is not in agreement with your own as due to bias and predjudice.



There is no question that WMDs had primacy in harnessing political motivation, obtaining domestic support for the war, and providing an international justification; but it's not at all clear that it had primacy in policy making decisions (see the Wolfowitz quote).

This is old ground and I do not expect any more agreement from you on it now than earlier: but what is clear, and was clear long before the war began, is that, despite their words, the Bush administration's primary goal was not simply to destroy Hussein's WMDs, it was to remove his regime (for whatever reason). To justify this course of action, they exaggerated and distorted every bit of evidence they could lay their hands on about aluminum tubes, mobile bio labs, and all the rest of it. The CIA has taken the fall for the intelligence failures, but this war was one driven by politics from the start. What the policy discussions really were, how much was self-delusion and incompetence, and how much was deliberate distortion we don't know, but I believe (and it's my opinion, not proven fact) that at least some members of the administration used 9/11 very deliberately as a means of implementing their foreign policy objectives in Iraq.




Yes indeed -- that's why it's more of a guidline really.

Why Thecla, this is the most verbose I've ever seen you. Impressive, and not even a bit of irreverence in the post (that does not mean I agree or disagree with you ). Your fingers must've gotten really tired from all the typing in this thread, just as my brain got tired from reading it



-A

[Kodi]

Sort of off-topic, but concerning the (edit-) South-EAST (not west) Asian tradegy, I am glad that Canada has increased our contributions from a mere $4 million to over $40 million. It makes a big difference in this world.

[Thecla]

Why Thecla, this is the most verbose I've ever seen you. Impressive, and not even a bit of irreverence in the post.

Yup, just add "made Thecla verbose and humorless" to the end of the list of negative consequences of the Iraq war.

[Ashock]

Yup, just add "made Thecla verbose and humorless" to the end of the list of negative consequences of the Iraq war.

Now now, let's keep politics out of this


-A

[Occhidiangela]

New York Times
December 30, 2004
All Justice, Too, Is Local
By Eric A. Posner

If you have not already seen this article,apropos the International Law thing, this is one of the better explanations of the current state of play in re International courts.

Oh, and a termite walks into a saloon and aska "Is the bar tender here?"

Occhi