Chairman Sheng-Ji Yang, Essays on Mind and Matter

[T-hawk]

The strongest argument for either position is indeed "can't you just see that this is the case?" "Can't you see that a particular molecular implementation of this structure in this case is irrelevant ... the consequences of the structure, which are constant"

I think there is still a logical inconsistency here. The particular molecular implementation is always relevant. The consequences of the structure are not constant. Every molecule is different in some way, at the very least by spatial position relative to other matter by Pauli exclusion, along with other characteristics like velocity and temperature. Any such difference can be magnified into macroscopic phenomena of any size by enough causal interactions. That's what I mean in arguing against structure: there is no abstraction that is not unaffected by the underlying particles, and I think to argue otherwise is logically unsupportable, not just a choice of first principle.

[T-hawk]

For T-Hawk. You cannot coherently argue against free will. Because if there was, in fact, no free will, then you would have no choice in adopting the belief that there is no free will.

Sure I can.  Manifesting a belief in free will doesn't make it true.  I can write a computer program that goes 10 PRINT "I have free will".  Doesn't mean it's true.  We're all particle programs printing that out.

In that case, however, how you can actually trust them? On what grounds can you believe that these arguments are in fact sound and your brain is not deceiving you into falsely believing that they are sound, just like your opponent is deceived by his brain into the belief that free will exists?

I can't know or prove that, as we've been over.  I choose (or my particles exhibit a behavior that I perceive as choice) to accept that it's the most likely basis of reality.  Based on the simplicity of its first principle, and also on the evidence and studies I've cited that human behavior is indeed determined by chemicals.

[Gavagai]

I can't know or prove that, as we've been over.  I choose (or my particles exhibit a behavior that I perceive as choice) to accept that it's the most likely basis of reality.  Based on the simplicity of its first principle, and also on the evidence and studies I've cited that human behavior is indeed determined by chemicals.

You cannot claim it to be the basis of your choice, that's my point. By your assumptions you make this choice because you are determined to do so by atoms from which you consist, everything else is an irrelevant illusion (what is even "first principle" in terms of chemical processes). In that case, however, your choice is in no way superior to an opposite choice of e. g. someone religious who is determined by his atoms just as well. You manifesting this choice amounts to a rather hilarious claim that your atoms are somehow better than his and you are justified to trust your inner brain chemistry more than the one of your opponent.

This is what I am talking about - at the level of "chemical processes" difference between "true" and "false" disappears and you cannot claim anything to be true. Any theory of truth establishes a relationship between our thoughts and the world but to do that it needs to conceive thoughts as something distinct.

[Bacchus]

Any such difference can be magnified into macroscopic phenomena of any size by enough causal interactions.

Sure. I'm not saying that lower-order processes are causally irrelevant, I'm saying I can't believe they they are the only thing that's causally relevant.

That's what I mean in arguing against structure: there is no abstraction that is not unaffected by the underlying particles

An extra 'not' in there? Interestingly the loaded choice of words sets a trap for you here. If X is only an abstraction, how could the real particles underlie it in any objective way? Surely, properly speaking, only abstractions underlie abstractions, and to the extent that abstraction consists of something real, it's no longer purely an abstraction?

But anyway, the point you want to make is clear: higher-order phenomena don't exist by themselves, they are always constituted of lower-order phenomena. I don't argue with this. What I want to point out is that causality can run downward the orders, as well as upward, whereas you insist that it runs only upward. To me, there are contexts when it makes sense to say things like "evolution by natural selection promoted development of mechanisms defending the microbiome, which took the form of stomach acidity that explains the presence of HCl in human bodies", as well as contexts when it makes sense to say things like "HCl reacts in such and such ways with compounds X, Y, Z, which results in denaturing of novel and hostile bacteria, preventing them from entering the gut". You can't answer the question of why humans carry HCl without looking at interactions at the ecological level, nor can a description of these ecological interactions be quite complete without a microlevel description of how exactly HCl fulfils its role.

Importantly for me, it didn't have to be HCl, could have been any different compound with the same function, whereas any description of evolution in terms of molecules bumping into each other, would leave absolutely no choice for there to be anything BUT HCl, because such a micro-account simply cannot admit counterfactuals at a macrolevel, it wouldn't even be clear just WHAT counterfactual we are postulating, as we would have to postulate it in the form of a difference in spatial positions of molecules. But, in evolution especially, we know full well that there are multiple options for realizing the same evolutionary functions -- we know this from multiple examples of convergent evolution, where completely different genomes amount to phenotypical features that share a similar function. Your analysis, which says that any function is an "illusion", or an "abstraction" would also lead you to assert that there is no similarity whatsoever between instances of convergent evolution. They should be proclaimed as different to each other as the particles they are made of. If not, if you admit real similarity between examples of convergent evolution, it has to be a similarity of structure, which means the structure has to be accepted as quite real. If you deny any similarity, and claim that this is just an example where an apparent "reduction to absurdity" just states the position of your version of materialism -- fine, but now you are teaching biologists their own trade on purely philosophical grounds, and that's never a good place to be in.

[TheHumanHydra]

I wanted to say, 'as does Bacchus about his framework,' but maybe it's instead that he feels these are too simple. smile

I wasn't actually advocating for a particular framework, I was trying to show that materialism by itself does not entail everything that T-Hawk rests on it, by outlining a framework that is entirely materialist, but at odds with what T-Hawk is saying. There are at least two "subjective preferences" at play here: the question of whether we have one material reality\mode of existence, or also additional ones (spiritual, mental, social, etc) -- which is the question of materialism\dualism, and the question of whether within that one material reality only the lowest-order processes have all the explanatory power (which can be phrased as causal power, constitutive power, definitional power, just to enumerate some of the ways T-Hawk expressed it). Both Hobbes and Dennett are materialists, very strong materialists at that, but Hobbes would agree with T-Hawk, whilst Dennett would not.

For myself, I don't see an urge to take a position on the number of "worlds", I don't really even find the question meaningful, but I do strongly feel that reductionsim to lowest-order processes fails spectacularly. It is properly a matter of faith, though. Some people have faith that the movement of molecules explain everything there is to explain, even when we have no such an explanation on our hands and when particular molecules and their movements are clearly substitutable to different molecules and different movements, resulting in the same higher-order effect. You can't say that they are wrong, the point of view is internally consistent, and can't be disproved by any empirical observation. Same goes for the other sort of people, who like me, have faith that higher-order structures are important in themselves. As far as I know, there is no logical inconsistency, and there is nothing you can show that would unsettle that thesis. The strongest argument for either position is indeed "can't you just see that this is the case?" "Can't you see that a particular molecular implementation of this structure in this case is irrelevant, that this structure just happens in any particular case to come about in some particualr way, but can also come about in multitude of others, so you can't say that the consequences of the structure, which are constant, are reducible to particles, which are not?" "Can't you see that everything is made of particles, and nothing that exists can exist except through a particular behavior of its constituent particles?" And I think all three of us agree on this, so hurray for constructive dialogue.

Thanks for the clarification, it helps a lot (and, yes, hurray!).

[T-hawk]

This is what I am talking about - at the level of "chemical processes" difference between "true" and "false" disappears and you cannot claim anything to be true.

Sure, then I don't.  The concepts of true and false only exist in our perceptions as well.

An extra 'not' in there?

Yeah, reworded that sentence one time too many.

If you deny any similarity, and claim that this is just an example where an apparent "reduction to absurdity" just states the position of your version of materialism -- fine, but now you are teaching biologists their own trade on purely philosophical grounds, and that's never a good place to be in.

Yes, that's where my argument comes to.  Any similarity between what you call structures is only in our perceptions.  I would submit that's the ultimate truth of biology.  The HCl got there by many groups of particles exhibiting aggregate behavior to produce and retain it, that's all.  It's still fine for a biologist to condense observations of those groups into abstractions to predict future behavior, as long as we know those abstractions can and will be inexact.

Nobody's responded to the evidence I presented a few times, that we know human behavior is influenceable through chemical means.  Alcohol, depressants, antidepressants, hallucinogens, neural parasites.  All of those when applied to brain chemistry cause different actions in humans.  How is that reconcilable with free will?

[TheHumanHydra]

This is what I am talking about - at the level of "chemical processes" difference between "true" and "false" disappears and you cannot claim anything to be true.

Sure, then I don't.  The concepts of true and false only exist in our perceptions as well.

If you deny any similarity, and claim that this is just an example where an apparent "reduction to absurdity" just states the position of your version of materialism -- fine, but now you are teaching biologists their own trade on purely philosophical grounds, and that's never a good place to be in.

Yes, that's where my argument comes to.  Any similarity between what you call structures is only in our perceptions.  I would submit that's the ultimate truth of biology.  The HCl got there by many groups of particles exhibiting aggregate behavior to produce and retain it, that's all.  It's still fine for a biologist to condense observations of those groups into abstractions to predict future behavior, as long as we know those abstractions can and will be inexact.

Nobody's responded to the evidence I presented a few times, that we know human behavior is influenceable through chemical means.  Alcohol, depressants, antidepressants, hallucinogens, neural parasites.  All of those when applied to brain chemistry cause different actions in humans.  How is that reconcilable with free will?

I don't understand the first statement. Surely 'true' simply means real, and false 'non-real'. Surely there is reality. What we perceive to be true is a perception, axiomatically, which may or may not actually be true. If anyone disagrees with this, I'd be really interested to hear more!

I was thinking about your last point -- it's a good one! I think we need to define free will. Is free will the ability to make choices independently of any influencing factors? That is, arbitrarily -- that is, effectively randomly? If so, I'm not sure free will is the thing of value we perceive it to be. Further, if one is capable of making a decision without any influencing factors, i.e. any cause, has one really made a decision -- that is, there is nothing without a cause, so if we cannot identify a cause for a decision, was a decision actually made?

Rather, I think free will is the ability to make choices based on reasons. That is, to make a choice, there must be something (rational or not) to sway you to that choice. I'm not sure chemical factors are incompatible with free choice, then. Some of your choices will be made by rational consideration of the evidence, foreseen outcomes, etc. Some will be made by algorithm. Some will be made on account of biochemical drives, like the decision to eat -- or to eat too much, or to drink, or to take drugs, or unnecessary risks, or what have you. More likely, your choices will be a complex interplay of these factors -- as in the nicotine addict who chooses to go cold.

To sum up, for decisions to be real, they must be based on deciding factors, so that free will (the aggregate of decisions) is consistent with any number of observed deciding factors, chemical, social, intellectual, including when they seem to exert a strong compulsion.

[Bacchus]

There's probably no easy way to select out the "philosophical" posts, especially as T-Hawk posts on both the debate and the game. In any case, we are pretty much at an end of the debate.

1. Chemical influences on behavior -- these don't really pose a problem for free will, no more than, say, torture does. Sure, you can use various means at your disposal to make some options appear highly attractive and others unattractive, and thus influence the choice. Choice still happens though, as far as the person is conscious. Chemicals can destroy consciousness completely, of course, and in this sense destroy free will, but that again doesn't prove much. If anything, because we have not encountered a person who would be chemically rid of consciousness, but would retain capacity for complex behaviour, it slightly reinforces the idea that consciousness is a causally important part of human behaviour.

2. Today I thought with a different example, which might be easier to accept as valid for T-Hawk, especially as it retains 'structuralism' whilst also accepting 'there is nothing but movement of stuff'. If you subscribe to the 'initial singularity' view of where the universe came from, you accept that all matter at one point formed a unity, and to the extent that everything follows deterministically, that unity still remains -- the universe is not made of multiply independent processes, it is all a single process, that unfolds from a single starting point. The apparent 'parts' to the process are just that -- apparent, we can choose to look at some subsection of the universe, but nothing except our perception isolates that subsection. As far as I understand modern cosmology, it explicitly refers to structure appearing within a previously unstructured and perfectly symmetrical ball of hot plasma of the Planck epoch. The symmetry breaks in a specific way which leads, down the line, to the appearance of particles and of empty space, the distributions of which do nothing but explicate the consequences of those original symmetry breaks. In any case, those details don't even matter particularly -- the point is that there is but a single pattern to the universe, its singularity is assured by the universe's origin in a singularity, and the lower level stuff -- from galaxies, to star systems, to atoms and quarks is nothing but bits of that pattern inspected at a lower scope. The story of the universe is not a story of a bunch of independent individual particles interacting to spuriously produce aggregate phenomena, it's a story of one thing unfolding itself in a single way, so that the position of any smaller bit is predetermined by the entire original structure, even if it looks like it's a stand-alone particle with 'its own' mass, charge, etc.

[T-hawk]

I was thinking about your last point -- it's a good one! I think we need to define free will.

I have a rigorous definition in mind - which I so take for granted as obvious that I neglected to actually state it.

Assume one can have complete and exact knowledge of the state of every elementary particle in a brain and all matter and forces that it could interact with, and enough computational power to calculate the result of their chemical interactions to any arbitrary period of time.  Given that, can the computational simulation accurately project what actions that brain will take?

If you say no, then that constitutes free will, that the brain or consciousness can influence matter in a way that is not deterministically caused by the particles; that's what defines a decision.  If you say yes, then that means the particles determine everything and there is no freedom or will or decision.

I say yes, of course.  We know chemical factors influence human behavior to some degree; and the simplest Occam's-razor solution is that they influence it all the way.

1. Chemical influences on behavior -- these don't really pose a problem for free will, no more than, say, torture does.

I say they do, as defined by the above argument.  Where is the stopping point to define that a result was a conscious choice rather than the result of chemical influence?  I posit that there is none, and I think the burden of proof rests on claiming otherwise.  The argument has to claim something like "free will can resist a chemical influence if it's strong enough", but then why isn't the will so free as to resist any chemical influence in the first place?

The story of the universe is not a story of a bunch of independent individual particles interacting to spuriously produce aggregate phenomena, it's a story of one thing unfolding itself in a single way, so that the position of any smaller bit is predetermined by the entire original structure, even if it looks like it's a stand-alone particle with 'its own' mass, charge, etc.

I follow this argument, though it doesn't seem you're saying anything different.  I agree that to define the universe as subdivisions of a Big Bang singularity is equivalent to defining it as the aggregate of the smallest particles.  Either is still deterministic.  (Quantum randomness is still a thing, and is where the symmetry-breaking from the singularity originated; but that's not relevant for my points, my definition of determinism includes behavior that resulted from quantum randomness.)

[ipecac]

Determinism of this sort is almost exactly the exact opposite of solipsism. Neither error has many adherents, because true believers would be regarded as quite mad.


Descartes split the mental and the physical realms, now there are all sorts of problems.

It's like a schizophrenic; once you accept their initial delusion, everything else is perfectly reasonable and logical.

Exactly.

"But if we attempt to trace his error in exact terms, we shall not find it quite so easy as we had supposed. Perhaps the nearest we can get to expressing it is to say this: that his mind moves in a perfect but narrow circle..the lunatic’s theory explains a large number of things, but it does not explain them in a large way…"