Chairman Sheng-Ji Yang, Essays on Mind and Matter

[TheHumanHydra]

ipecac, I'd like to see you develop your views a bit more fully. You seem to have some knowledge on this topic, but are coming across a bit disjointedly, without addressing many of T-hawk's points.

T-hawk, I haven't forgotten, I will make my response when it is ready.

[Bacchus]

T-Hawk, what's your stance on mathematical and geometric ontologies? Are there objective truths in mathematics? What are they truths about?

[ipecac]

ipecac, I'd like to see you develop your views a bit more fully. You seem to have some knowledge on this topic, but are coming across a bit disjointedly, without addressing many of T-hawk's points.

Sure.

First, I want to point out how self-undermining T-Hawk's position is metaphysically. At best, it's a disastrous 'I, a mindless bag of cells aka T-Hawk, am compelled by chemicals to make this arguments. You don't have a conscious mind to consider and evaluate it though' type. At worst, it's 'there is no higher meaning, language and logic have no real meaning but you should accept the strength of my argument formulated with language and logic' self-annihilation.

Let's move on build a conception of the mind that can withstand T-Hawk's critique. It's over-simplified, and we can call it the 'interface' model - the mind interfaces with the body, with the mind being the part that wills to act.

This concurs with some of our deepest intuitions:

a) our identity consists in part of the body, and also the mind
b) they are distinct, of different substances yet somehow joined together

When people think about the mind, they intuitively think along these lines. In such a model, the mind wills to act, but whether the intended act happens is dependent on many things, because it is trying to act through a physical body. There are some necessary constraints, including:

1) physical constraints of the body (e.g. no running at 90 miles/hour)
2) outside physical constraints (e.g. gravity)

Also, some things might happen to constrain or overrule the act willed:

1) reflexes or instinctive behaviour (e.g. fight or flight behaviour overruling rational responses)
2) Damage to nerves preventing the body from responding as intended (e.g. spinal injury)
3) Stimuli, physical or chemical, 'hijacking' the body (e.g. opiates)

Thus T-Hawk's main criticism, below, just has no force.

Nobody's responded to the evidence I presented a few times, that we know human behavior is influenceable through chemical means.  Alcohol, depressants, antidepressants, hallucinogens, neural parasites.  All of those when applied to brain chemistry cause different actions in humans.  How is that reconcilable with free will?

In short, you can't always do what you want because your body is in a physical and chemical world, and sometimes things get in the way, or even hijack your body to respond in a different way. This doesn't mean that there isn't something that wills.

[ipecac]

The next natural question is 'how does the body and mind "interface"?' It's an old question, dating at least to Descartes, and still we have no answer. We know a lot about physics, chemistry, and biology, but we don't know very much about something close to us, our brain. This is likely because the brain is perhaps the most complex thing we know of. And it is the brain that lies at the heart of key questions about mind, consciousness, and decision-making.

In light of the abover, we need more evidence, and certainly we can hypothesise and speculate. But science can't render a verdict on this. Now I'll segue to rebut T-Hawk's position.

The type of determinism of T-Hawk's position pretends to be scientific but isn't. In the absence of sufficient evidence, it is  that the physical-chemical is all there is. This isn't going whether the evidence leads, it's just philosophical dogma.

'There's only the physical-chemical in the physical realm' is just bad metaphysically on several levels. I've pointed out a few ways, and it looks like Bacchus is going the 'well, what about mathematics and mathematical truths that undergirds science?' route. One could make similar criticisms using 'well, what about language and logic?' as well.

You've said that my points are a bit disjointed. That may be, because the position is just bad on so many different levels and I was trying to address a number of them.

[TheHumanHydra]

You've said that my points are a bit disjointed. That may be, because the position is just bad on so many different levels and I was trying to address a number of them.

Thanks for your clarifications. I'm new to all this and just need to be walked through some of the arguments.

Honestly, though, T-hawk raised a great point in his most recent post. Even though I suppose we don't understand the brain fully, don't you think it's likely it is simply a very complex machine made up of matter with energy running through it -- ultimately, particles? I think I'm comfortable saying the seat of my will is a physical mechanism, but this does discredit free will as T-hawk defines it. Conversely, if you think there is a metaphysical component to the will, I don't know why one wouldn't go all the way and say there is a god as well (this, too, is what we intuited before we all became atheists).

I will say that even if T-hawk is right and decisions are ultimately determined by particle positions, I think that Bacchus is still 100% correct that higher-order aggregates of particles and particle interactions can be meaningfully described (e.g. hearts, words, winds) and are more usefully assigned causal significance.

[ipecac]

Honestly, though, T-hawk raised a great point in his most recent post. Even though I suppose we don't understand the brain fully, don't you think it's likely it is simply a very complex machine made up of matter with energy running through it -- ultimately, particles?

Why should I? That way lies mad nihilism.

So now we have minds denying their own existence because of determinism, in short "I think not, therefore I am not". It's plain lunacy.

Conversely, if you think there is a metaphysical component to the will, I don't know why one wouldn't go all the way and say there is a god as well (this, too, is what we intuited before we all became atheists).

All?

[TheHumanHydra]

Honestly, though, T-hawk raised a great point in his most recent post. Even though I suppose we don't understand the brain fully, don't you think it's likely it is simply a very complex machine made up of matter with energy running through it -- ultimately, particles?

Why should I? That way lies mad nihilism.

So now we have minds denying their own existence because of determinism, in short "I think not, therefore I am not". It's plain lunacy.

Conversely, if you think there is a metaphysical component to the will, I don't know why one wouldn't go all the way and say there is a god as well (this, too, is what we intuited before we all became atheists).

All?

Look, I am a theist and a Christian. I think you are, too. But I think it's valuable to engage with these questions. So I will play devil's advocate and claim that there is no evidence of any metaphysical aspect to the mind. How would you respond to that?

[Bacchus]

I think that Bacchus is still 100% correct that higher-order aggregates of particles and particle interactions can be meaningfully described (e.g. hearts, words, winds) and are more usefully assigned causal significance.

Your choice of words really warms my heart. Here is the thing -- I have no idea how causality works. Every account of causality, of what causes are and how they relate to effects that I know is riddled with serious problems. One of which is the one we are discussing: any process can seemingly be described on multiple ontological levels. If so, does causality vest in each of them, in some of them, or in none of them? Do causes even exist properly? We certainly can't think without thinking in terms of causes, but is this an artifact of how our consciousness functions, or is it a genuine feature of the world?

So, when I encounter a strong determinist like T-Hawk, or a strong indeterminist, my primary reaction is fascination and even envy. Wow, these guys are comfortable with what it means for the world to be determined (or otherwise). I have no clue, just a bunch of doubts which can raised against any strong assertion.

I am fairly optimistic though. Our thinking, which has causality right at its centre, is effective, it actually works -- which seems to suggest that even if there aren't causes as we think them, there is at least something isomorphic to them in the structure of the world. And that much we can say -- we can meaningfully describe things at multiple ontological levels, and usefully attribute causality to them. Does it mean those things really exist in themselves, or are they collections of parts, or are they themselves only parts of a larger whole, which determines their nature? Is that question even sensible to ask?

I used to think not, I was a straight up instrumentalist about mental concepts -- saw them as pure fiction developed or discarded as and when needed. Today I can't convince myself that a concept can be pure fiction if it works. But then one can't be a realist about concepts either, because we pretty much know for a fact that our, say, current physics is only one possible working physics among many, so how can we claim that its ontology is the actual one? So again, envious of T-Hawk, he is a realist about particles, and an instrumentalist about everything else, and is comfortable with that. When I raise doubts its only because I'd wish I had the same conviction.

[ipecac]

Look, I am a theist and a Christian. I think you are, too. But I think it's valuable to engage with these questions. So I will play devil's advocate and claim that there is no evidence of any metaphysical aspect to the mind. How would you respond to that?

The rhetorical force of that claim can be blunted with 'absence of evidence doesn't imply evidence of absence', as well as the valid counterpoint that there is no evidence that there cannot exist a mental substance that differs from the physical.

Then there is the traditional approach, which is to appeal to our deepest intuitive beliefs (on which we found all our thinking): that the mental is distinct from the physical, that there is a thinking 'I', that there is some decision making and willing happening. There is also the qualia approach, pointing out that the "raw feels" that we perceive indicate the existence of the consciousness. But all this is insufficient for the skeptic who demands a standard of evidence impossibly high.

The approach I would prefer is indirect.

First I set the context: in Proper Thought, theere has been a steady eradication of all that is transcedental. God is banished from the picture, Darwinism takes out design, purpose and telos. Relativism and utilitarianism undermine morality and all values, modern aesthetics denies beauty. Postmodernism wrecks meaning and truth.

What then is left in Proper Thought that is transcedental? The mind and internal experience, but Proper Thought has been after them for some time too, setting physicalism on them.

Next is to point out the consequence: what happens? No mind exists, no will making decisions, no conscious act, no higher meaning. So when T-Hawk argues for physicalism, he is also saying that there is no mind of T-Hawk that is making that argument. He is not conscious of it, and he is compelled to say it by chemicals. The mind of you, the listener, doesn't exist too, and you are not conscious of the argument too. Whether you assent to T-Hawk's view or not is not within your control, because there is no free will. So what's the point, one asks, but there is no such thing as point or purpose; more importantly it's not like you have any free will, and consciousness doesn't exist, so you're not even aware of this, and there's not a real 'you' (as you normally mean it) since there is no such thing as mind......

....Also according to T-Hawk's position, higher things like language and logic don't have meaning. Now, you might be concerned about his argument, which is based on language and logic after all, what then happens to it, but then you don't have any choice in the matter whether to question the argument, neither does he (no free will), and you're both not aware of all this (no consciousness, remember), and there's no 'you' in terms of mind anyway....

So. There's a reason why I've talked about madness a few times in this thread. Because that way truly leads to madness, that nightmare glimpsed when you contemplate what T-Hawk's position really entails.

Pure reason isn't not sufficient to convince someone not to plunge into such madness. What I can do is to point out as best as I can the nightmare and self-annihilation that awaits.

Once they see that, then I can ask, 'Why do you want this madness so badly?'

[ipecac]

So again, envious of T-Hawk, he is a realist about particles, and an instrumentalist about everything else, and is comfortable with that. When I raise doubts its only because I'd wish I had the same conviction.

Is faith en vogue now in Proper Thought?