Chairman Sheng-Ji Yang, Essays on Mind and Matter

[ipecac]

Your framework, notably, allows you to perform any behaviour or hold any attitude you wish, without moral constraint. There is no guilt (beyond the chemical), because you don't have agency (and morality doesn't exist as such anyway). There is no reason not to do anything other than a) lack of desire, b) inability, or c) knowledge of undesired consequences thereof.

This is indeed true.  What holds me back from unfettered theft or anything like that is acceptance of the societal consequences.  I'm willing to refrain from such activities based on the socially enacted rules that others will observe to refrain from doing it to me.  It is positive-sum for two organisms to agree not to kill each other, even if one would gain by doing so.  I do have no moral problem with committing truly victimless crimes, like jaywalking or whatever.

And what happens if you can get a away with a grievous crime, if there are no societal consequences because no one knows about it?

I've been accused of being brusque or hostile in this discussion, but there's a very good reason for how I've posted. The Atlantic article got one thing right, at least: believing that there is no free will removes the normal moral constraints that inhibit people's darkest urges. In other words, this amoral philosophy is downright dangerous because everything is permitted, and I mean everything. Downright dangerous.

[T-hawk]

Well, firstly I have to say that it's good that you're dropping the argument from Occam's razor/simplicity. It is only a heuristic, and there are other important heuristics such as whether what is proposed accords with intuition. There is also the question of simplicity itself: what is more 'simple', invoking a complex chemical cascade together with a 'consciousness field' or the intuitive explanation that a non-material mind exists? But we can leave this aside.

Back to your response on laws of physics: I expected this solution. Instead of saying the laws are something external to the particles, they are said to be part of the particles' nature, part of their essence. The consequence of this, however, is that you lose the 'iron law' aspect that many associate with the laws of physics: you can only talk about the tendencies of particles, and you can't rule out the non-material.

Really, there is nothing more in your current position that can rule out the non-physical. All you have left is a very non-intuitive preference to assert that it is so.

I know the non-physical can't be ruled out simply by logic; stop trying to say that I'm claiming that.  What we do have is experimental evidence: we've established falsifiable hypotheses to describe particle behavior and conducted measurements to confirm it.  We don't have experimental evidence of anything non-material.  I'm aware of the trap of definitions, that any such experimental evidence could be called physical results and thus establish materialism by tautology; but I'm genuinely trying to avoid that.  The falsification of my hypothesis would be experimental evidence that shows identical particles leading to different results in a way that is best explained by the direction of a consciousness or free will.  (I did say no particles are identical, by Pauli exclusion and Heisenberg uncertainty, but I'd accept experimental evidence within a margin of error to account for those limitations.)

I'm also not dropping Occam's razor, it just didn't come up there.  Occam's razor is a heuristic that argues against your middle-ground solution.  Rather than that particles sometimes do and sometimes don't fully describe an organism's behavior, it's simpler to conclude that the particles go all the way all the time.  And I contend that the burden of evidence/proof is on the more complex solution.  And I mean complex in terms of first principles, not what you describe as the 'complex chemical cascade' that is only perceived as complex in deriving from so much aggregation of the simple laws.

And what happens if you can get a away with a grievous crime, if there are no societal consequences because no one knows about it?

I've been accused of being brusque or hostile in this discussion, but there's a very good reason for how I've posted. The Atlantic article got one thing right, at least: believing that there is no free will removes the normal moral constraints that inhibit people's darkest urges. In other words, this amoral philosophy is downright dangerous because everything is permitted, and I mean everything. Downright dangerous.

Dangerous to society does not at all preclude its reality.  As I said before, that's a reason you seek to disbelieve materialism, not an argument against its truth.

[T-hawk]

1. I think we're talking past each other a little. Under your framework, I agree completely it is not wrong to create a Genejack (because there is no wrong). What I meant by this was to try and persuade anyone who might want to make a Genejack not to get too worked up about doing so, because under your framework, in contrast to Yang, there isn't really any great driving purpose to 'optimizing' humanity (and I don't want them to do it).

My framework is a superset of Yang's.  There is no inherent or objective purpose to life, no more than there is a purpose to the sun, it just exists like any other particles.  Purpose is whatever life capable of perception subjectively invents for itself.  The driving purpose of optimizing humanity is what Yang subjectively designates as his purpose.  Making entertaining reports about SMAC is what I've designated as mine this month.

As to randomness, I'm not really referring to any real (factual or perceived) random behaviour, but to the hypothetical idea of a mind that could 'choose' without physical reasons for its choices -- it's not really choosing (= discriminating, preferring, i.e., on some basis), it's submitting its choices to what amounts to some kind of RNG.

I'm still a bit confused by this position - if it's not random, why did you come back to the idea of a RNG?  I'm actually trying to help you clarify your position: it's stronger if you can say that the mind's choices or preferences come from its own devising, since if it's really random then that's indistinguishable from materialistic quantum randomness.

4. I ask this because your argument with Bacchus seems to me mostly semantic, not factual. I.e., of course under materialism all things and all causes are reducible to particles, but is it meaningful to describe those things on a higher level? By speaking of chemicals, not particles, you seem to have tacitly acknowledged the utility of describing causes on a higher level (and the practical reality of those causes).

The utility and meaning comes from and belongs only to human perception.  There is no fundamental reality to describing "the sun" rather than "10^57 protons and electrons within a volume radius of 10^43 Planck lengths."  But there is practical value within human perception in describing that large aggregation of fusion phenomena as "the sun" and anticipating the energy we receive from it on a periodic basis.  That value only exists in terms of our subjective purposes -- it's only that the subjective purpose of "eating plants for energy to continue existing" is shared by just about everyone.  But it's possible to postulate organisms that don't share that subjective purpose: one example would be the Hitchhiker's Guide scene with the animal that states it wants to be eaten.

[TheHumanHydra]

1. I think we're talking past each other a little. Under your framework, I agree completely it is not wrong to create a Genejack (because there is no wrong). What I meant by this was to try and persuade anyone who might want to make a Genejack not to get too worked up about doing so, because under your framework, in contrast to Yang, there isn't really any great driving purpose to 'optimizing' humanity (and I don't want them to do it).

My framework is a superset of Yang's.  There is no inherent or objective purpose to life, no more than there is a purpose to the sun, it just exists like any other particles.  Purpose is whatever life capable of perception subjectively invents for itself.  The driving purpose of optimizing humanity is what Yang subjectively designates as his purpose.  Making entertaining reports about SMAC is what I've designated as mine this month.

As to randomness, I'm not really referring to any real (factual or perceived) random behaviour, but to the hypothetical idea of a mind that could 'choose' without physical reasons for its choices -- it's not really choosing (= discriminating, preferring, i.e., on some basis), it's submitting its choices to what amounts to some kind of RNG.

I'm still a bit confused by this position - if it's not random, why did you come back to the idea of a RNG?  I'm actually trying to help you clarify your position: it's stronger if you can say that the mind's choices or preferences come from its own devising, since if it's really random then that's indistinguishable from materialistic quantum randomness.

4. I ask this because your argument with Bacchus seems to me mostly semantic, not factual. I.e., of course under materialism all things and all causes are reducible to particles, but is it meaningful to describe those things on a higher level? By speaking of chemicals, not particles, you seem to have tacitly acknowledged the utility of describing causes on a higher level (and the practical reality of those causes).

The utility and meaning comes from and belongs only to human perception.  There is no fundamental reality to describing "the sun" rather than "10^57 protons and electrons within a volume radius of 10^43 Planck lengths."  But there is practical value within human perception in describing that large aggregation of fusion phenomena as "the sun" and anticipating the energy we receive from it on a periodic basis.  That value only exists in terms of our subjective purposes -- it's only that the subjective purpose of "eating plants for energy to continue existing" is shared by just about everyone.  But it's possible to postulate organisms that don't share that subjective purpose: one example would be the Hitchhiker's Guide scene with the animal that states it wants to be eaten.

1. Yes, I'm agreed. The point is that, since these objectives are subjective, when it comes time for society to have its debate on Genejacks (or whatever else), I don't think our Hive-equivalents are going to have much of a leg to stand on if they say, 'We must do this,' or, 'The other party is wrong for not wanting to do this'. If there's no inherent 'meaning' to anything, the other party can't be wrong, they just have different self-assigned objectives -- of no less legitimacy.

This point is a bit in the realm of science fiction. While hopefully irrelevant, it's an attempt to head off any drive to implement societal changes I consider disturbing, by saying, 'Look, there's no great significance attached to this change. Don't push too hard'. That's all.

2. Sorry, I'm not communicating clearly. I will try, but I may not be able to. 
a) You said free will is a mind making choices without employing its physical nature.
b) I said that such a mind would not be making choices, because it would not have reasons for its choices.
c) I said that such a mind would instead be operating randomly. The nature of the randomness is immaterial (it is rhetorical and hypothetical). It could be materialistic quantum randomness. It could be rolling a die (also deterministic, but not a choice). The point is that it is not selecting based on criteria.
d) So I said that it is consistent with a mind capable of choosing that the mind employ its physical nature to do so. This provides the reasons for its choice.
e) So I think a materialist could talk about choices and agency meaningfully with the understanding that the mind is a mechanism for making choices that operates according to physical laws. Yes, his or her choices are predictable, but they are being made.

3. Hmm, okay, so then they're not reconcilable -- you say the perception does not represent the nature of the things, Bacchus says the thing is real as perceived (change in plurality deliberate)? But your position seems to deny the reality of a) similarities and b) connections between particles. Surely if I say, 'the Sun', I mean the collection of particles that share a certain kind of (real) linkages and that have certain (real) similarities. You might say those linkages and similarities are chosen arbitrarily from amongst others, but one could reply that they simply have different words to reflect those realities, like 'solar system', or no word (but one could come up with one) if they are not useful to describe -- but the words still describe some real selected quantity of particles and bonds.

[Bacchus]

Started a new job in earnest and wont be able to contribute for a while. I wanted to thank everyone for the discussion so far, though, it helped clarify and sharpen some thoughts around the subject, and stimulated coming up with some nice examples.

There are still a few things I'd like to address, so hopefully will have time later.

THH, me and T-Hawk can't come to a compromise position exactly because T-Hawk asserts strong reductionism. What I've been trying to show is that we have no specific reason to prefer rendering reality at one ontological level or the other, because that actually IS a matter of perspective. The difference in positions is not semantic, nor (empirically) factual -- it is properly metaphysical. And some people would label all such talk nonsense (but that hurts T-Hawk's posiiton more than mine, as it asserts more).

Things I'd like to come back to: first-person experiences as evidence (analogy with programs fails as programs are third-person experiences), simulation of reality from information about particles (fails, you wouldn't be able to answer such basic questions as 'is there a towel in room 304 of Grand Central hotel' on particle coordinates alone, which T-Hawk would.answer by saying such questions are not actually factual, until rendered in terms of particles, which COULD then be answered, but that's where it gets interesting), an explanation of how will works on the example of the appettite-supressing drug (that particular scenario entails a FUTURE event -- hunger to be experienced, affecting a PRIOR event -- decision to take the pill, plainly an impossibility under a narrow physicalism, whether of a reductionist sort or not), and a summary table of the many different metaphysical issues we are discussing and how their combinations play out.

Sorry for caps, typing off phone.

[Bacchus]

Also, I would like to say that your clarity of thought on issues without prior background in the subject is amazing, THH.

Edit: skimming through the Career thread, saw that shallow_thought is a particle physicist, someone ping him -- I'd enjoy hearing how hilariously wrong we all are.

[TheHumanHydra]

Thanks, Bacchus, I really appreciate that. Thanks for your clarifications of what you mean on various points. I appreciate all the ideas you and T-hawk have presented in this thread. It's been highly engaging and thought provoking. And congratulations on your new job!

[shallow_thought]

Also, I would like to say that your clarity of thought on issues without prior background in the subject is amazing, THH.

Edit: skimming through the Career thread, saw that shallow_thought is a particle physicist, someone ping him -- I'd enjoy hearing how hilariously wrong we all are.

I studied particle physics at uni at master's level, but that was a long time ago. I'm also on holiday and drunk , but I'll try to find time to catch up on this thread and comment at some point...

[T-hawk]

1. Yes, I'm agreed. The point is that, since these objectives are subjective, when it comes time for society to have its debate on Genejacks (or whatever else), I don't think our Hive-equivalents are going to have much of a leg to stand on if they say, 'We must do this,' or, 'The other party is wrong for not wanting to do this'. If there's no inherent 'meaning' to anything, the other party can't be wrong, they just have different self-assigned objectives -- of no less legitimacy.

I think I misread your position before. Is this it? : You don't want Genejacks to exist, but you don't have an ethical argument that creating them is wrong, so your best remaining argument is to convince their would-be inventors that they're not necessary.

If that's right, then why don't you want Genejacks to exist? They'd be serving you, after all. You call the idea disturbing, but why? It's not a proposal to turn you into one.

I think the only solid argument there is Bacchus's "what if it goes wrong", what if it's still a consciousness perceiving desire but just can't say so. The metaphysical argument is that a Genejack still has a God-given soul and right for that to exist without tampering. But if neither of those are the case, then developing a Genejack out of biology is no different than developing a household robot out of electronics.

The point is that it is not selecting based on criteria.

That's the point I'm still confused on. Why wouldn't the actions of a free will be based on criteria? Choosing what values to uphold, choosing which movements of its particles it will prefer... that's what I would think would define a free will, criteria based on opinion and perception rather than aggregations of particles.

(change in plurality deliberate)?

Deliberate on my part, but only for the convenience of language, not relevancy to the argument. I do often intentionally restate an argument from plural to singular, just because it tends to make the grammar clearer.

But your position seems to deny the reality of a) similarities and b) connections between particles. Surely if I say, 'the Sun', I mean the collection of particles that share a certain kind of (real) linkages and that have certain (real) similarities. You might say those linkages and similarities are chosen arbitrarily from amongst others, but one could reply that they simply have different words to reflect those realities, like 'solar system', or no word (but one could come up with one) if they are not useful to describe -- but the words still describe some real selected quantity of particles and bonds.

Yes, that's exactly what I've been denying all along. I used the Sun in particular because those particles have little or no linkage, the hydrogen and helium atoms do not bond. They are only similar in their position being near enough to enough others that gravitational collapse causes a temperature increase, and anything we observe like sunspots or solar flares is just a temperature gradient. Yes, I do say those linkages and similarities are chosen arbitrarily. What exactly do you mean by "the Sun", where is the dividing line where a particle is or isn't part of it -- the Sun's atmosphere diffuses into space over millions of kilometers. This is where I hold to the position that Bacchus calls reductionism (though I don't see it as reducing, I see it as elementary) - to argue the reality of a higher-order phenomenon, you need to define each threshold and edge case for what is included in the phenomenon, while the bottom-up materialism position simply says the particles will do whatever their forces dictate.

[Bacchus]

Could better describe your position as atomism, I guess, it also gives a clearer genealogy and historical references.

I wondered whether 'ontological pluralism' exists as a term, and it turns out it does. https://link.springer.com/article/10.100...7-x#page-1

EDIT:
Funnily enough, for me, the inability to show a clear cut-off for the Sun in terms particles, whilst the Sun itself is a perfectly workable, effective concept shows that it's particle picture of reality that's limited. For example, we can quite scientifically estimate the mass of the Sun, thanks to general relativity, without any references to particles whatsoever. We could then use that data to estimate how many particles the Sun is probably made of, but it clearly shows that the particle picture is, in this case, derivative.

Just briefly, my biggest problem with your view, T-Hawk, is that you don't quite go all the way. You correctly hold everything up to be a tool of the mind, but you still want to leave something objectively knowable to hang our understandings on, and you think particles can play this role. Something that can relieve the responsibility of the human mind from figuring it out, something that's just given to us objectively. I say whichever particles we come up with are just as arbitrary, and no fact stated in terms of particles is any more factual or true than a fact stated in terms of anything else. Not so much because humans have access to very correct descriptions of reality, but more because all of our descriptions are equally detached from it. The world just is, it may even mostly exist in ways that we don't even register, the bit that we do register and purport to describe is most likely to be as froth on the sea.

However, that froth is what the entirety of our reality consists of, and in our reality the Sun has prima facie existence just because we see it. Every model we come up with has to, first and foremost, account for that fact. And it's a scary thought, an even scarier one than yours -- that there is literally no 'objective' (mind-independent) basis that our knowledge can be held up against, that we have to trust ourselves, and not the world, which we do not experience except through senses and the mind, both limited in their function.