Chairman Sheng-Ji Yang, Essays on Mind and Matter

[ipecac]

I have to come back here, because I phrased my claim badly. Let's assume that General Relativity is a valid description of reality (not an estimate), at least of mass -- as far as I can see, there is no reason to deny GR this status, if you are willing to ascribe it to quantum mechanics. In GR, there are no 'particles' at all, it's not particles that have mass as a quality, and the total mass of a system is not a bunch of particle masses added up. An account of mass given by GR cannot be wrong 'by a particle', because it admits no particles at all. It can be wrong by a degree of curvature of spacetime, it can be wrong by some other field characteristic, a coefficient, but not by a particle (unless we introduce particles as a way to describe particular patterns of local spacetime curvatures, in a similar way that we introduce a macroscopic phenomena in your account to describe particular sets of particles). The picture offered by GR is that of a single, 'fundamental' spacetime, which exists it whatever convoluted state that it does, and some of those convolutions can perceived to be particles by humans just because we are used to think of the world as split into discreet and disctinctive objects. In a GR-like reality, there is no non-arbitrary boundary to a "particle" though -- there is a spacetime effect which is pronounced locally, but which trails off (if I understand correctly) in a gradual fashion, ultimately to infinity. This is why GR doesn't have anything at all to say about what constitutes a "body" in its model -- a body can be anything as large as the Sun, or as small as a molecule, they are equally arbitrary localizations of spacetime.

This links to what ipecac said about fields -- we can characterize the entire world as a single field, where 'particles' are just characteristic excitation of what is 'actually' (in terms of the model) a single unbroken structure, in which we, for our understanding, pick out quantized bits and call them names. This of course links back to the infinite divisibility discussion -- a real number field IS infinitely divisible. As for lack of experimental evidence, well the lack applies to any particle model just as much. All we can say is that an account given in terms of particles lets us make effective predictions, as does an account given in terms of fields. In any case, the lack of experimental evidence should lead us to avoid making a strong claim (i.e. claim that particles are fundamental) and instead lead towards a weaker claim (that we don't even know what's fundamental).

This is a great post. I don't have much to add, except to note a few points about the state of ontology in physics that are striking (at least to me).

The first is how there's been a big shift from a localised viewpoint to completely unlocalised, from particles that we think of inhabiting a specific place in space to fields that are omnipresent everywhere in space. The credit for 'establishing' that particles exist is given to Einstein and his paper on Brownian motion, but that was quickly shaken by the Heisenberg Uncertainty theorem and the idea of delocalised particles (including the electron in chemistry), and seemingly superseded by the emergence of approaches to physics that tackle completely unlocalised fields.

The other is that there are more than one 'fundamental' approaches to what's happening in the physical world. Besides the two already mentioned for matter and energy, physicists in the context of GR can't help but treat space-time as a thing in and of itself. So in the Big Bang Theory, space-time is said to rapidly expand near the very beginning. Space-time is certainly not matter/energy and is not made of particles, but is something else altogether.

We don't really know what's fundamental, as Bacchus said, and maybe what we know actually suggests that there is no one fundamental perspective. But certainly we don't know enough, given the current state of physics, to say that particles are fundamental, let alone that there are only physical particles and nothing else.

[ipecac]

Another thing is that we have rather accurate mathematical equations to describe observables, but what is actually happening, is it particles or field or superstrings - how to correctly interpret what is really happening is not something that the math equations can answer in and of themselves. A second example would be wavefunction collapse, where there are many interpretations of what's going on, including the Copenhagen interpretation, many-worlds interpretation, objective collapse and so on.

In fact, the collapse of wavefunctions is a part of physics where non-physical mind can enter the picture. The von Neumann interpretation can be summarised as 'consciousness causes collapse'; the wavefunction collapses upon observation by a mind.

[TheHumanHydra]

1. Yes, I'm agreed. The point is that, since these objectives are subjective, when it comes time for society to have its debate on Genejacks (or whatever else), I don't think our Hive-equivalents are going to have much of a leg to stand on if they say, 'We must do this,' or, 'The other party is wrong for not wanting to do this'. If there's no inherent 'meaning' to anything, the other party can't be wrong, they just have different self-assigned objectives -- of no less legitimacy.

I think I misread your position before.  Is this it? : You don't want Genejacks to exist, but you don't have an ethical argument that creating them is wrong, so your best remaining argument is to convince their would-be inventors that they're not necessary.

If that's right, then why don't you want Genejacks to exist?  They'd be serving you, after all.  You call the idea disturbing, but why?  It's not a proposal to turn you into one.

I think the only solid argument there is Bacchus's "what if it goes wrong", what if it's still a consciousness perceiving desire but just can't say so.  The metaphysical argument is that a Genejack still has a God-given soul and right for that to exist without tampering.  But if neither of those are the case, then developing a Genejack out of biology is no different than developing a household robot out of electronics.

The point is that it is not selecting based on criteria.

That's the point I'm still confused on.  Why wouldn't the actions of a free will be based on criteria?  Choosing what values to uphold, choosing which movements of its particles it will prefer... that's what I would think would define a free will, criteria based on opinion and perception rather than aggregations of particles.

(change in plurality deliberate)?

Deliberate on my part, but only for the convenience of language, not relevancy to the argument.  I do often intentionally restate an argument from plural to singular, just because it tends to make the grammar clearer.

But your position seems to deny the reality of a) similarities and b) connections between particles. Surely if I say, 'the Sun', I mean the collection of particles that share a certain kind of (real) linkages and that have certain (real) similarities. You might say those linkages and similarities are chosen arbitrarily from amongst others, but one could reply that they simply have different words to reflect those realities, like 'solar system', or no word (but one could come up with one) if they are not useful to describe -- but the words still describe some real selected quantity of particles and bonds.

Yes, that's exactly what I've been denying all along.  I used the Sun in particular because those particles have little or no linkage, the hydrogen and helium atoms do not bond.  They are only similar in their position being near enough to enough others that gravitational collapse causes a temperature increase, and anything we observe like sunspots or solar flares is just a temperature gradient.  Yes, I do say those linkages and similarities are chosen arbitrarily.  What exactly do you mean by "the Sun", where is the dividing line where a particle is or isn't part of it -- the Sun's atmosphere diffuses into space over millions of kilometers.  This is where I hold to the position that Bacchus calls reductionism (though I don't see it as reducing, I see it as elementary) - to argue the reality of a higher-order phenomenon, you need to define each threshold and edge case for what is included in the phenomenon, while the bottom-up materialism position simply says the particles will do whatever their forces dictate.

1. Not quite -- I don't want Genejacks to exist, and I don't have a moral argument their would-be creators would accept (because of different frameworks), so I must persuade them otherwise. The argument is that there's no overriding cosmic drive to achieve the purposes the Genejacks would ostensibly serve, so it's irrational to push too hard to make them. The would-be inventors should simply assign themselves different goals (which shouldn't be difficult since none of them have intrinsic worth) and everyone will be happy.

I don't think Bacchus's argument applies because it appeals to a morality that should be denied by Yangian materialists -- why does it matter if the other being is a fellow consciousness? One might say that infringing on it violates the social contract, but then simply renegotiate the contract. And obviously the one about the soul doesn't apply, so I must use different methods.

As for why the idea is disturbing, it does not matter that I am not the one to be made a Genejack, but that I have empathy for the one who is (but he cannot feel what I am concerned about -- but he could have).

2. Yes, the actions of a free will must be based on criteria. It must choose which values to uphold, as expressed in the particle fabric of our universe, choose which particle positions it prefers, based on the feedback those positions give it. Its criteria are opinions formed by the experience of this particle existence and perceptions of that existence -- so that it is not at all inconsistent with free will that the will make its choices under the influence of chemical factors, natural or not. In fact, it may be necessary in order for the will to be a will at all.

(3. I meant I changed the plurality within my sentence to try and better represent your and Bacchus's arguments. I hadn't noticed you converting to the singular, but good call.)

4. So, first of all, an admission. I thought there was something chemical to the coherence of the molecules in the sun. Nevertheless, I think my point stands in that its constituents are linked by gravity. But I think there's a bit of inconsistency in your statement -- you denied that there are similarities and linkages between particles, then established a similarity in position/proximity, a link in mutual gravitation, and similarities in temperature and temperature increase, and then said the similarities and linkages are arbitrarily selected. I think your argument relies more on the latter -- in that case, yeah, we don't define our term for the sun too precisely. I wonder if we need to -- for example, if I say, 'humanity', I mean all humans. I am not able to define who or where (or when) all those humans are, but they are still a recognizable (real) set. But more concretely, if you say, 'to argue the reality of a higher-order phenomenon, you need to define each threshold and edge case for what is included in the phenomenon,' don't you admit that if we did so, e.g., if we had a computer powerful enough to pinpoint every particle location, we could accurately and realistically describe higher-order phenomena? Moreover, if the sun is a particularly fuzzy example when it comes to thresholds/boundaries, what about cases where the boundaries are much more distinct? I suspect that the pen I'm looking at doesn't experience the same falloff and mutability as the sun.

In sum, language (at least the noun part) is differentiation. No matter the level at which the differences are described, they represent the real. To say otherwise I think is to deny the real. (Even the word particles, emphasis on the suffix, is a differentiation. I think from that differentiation, every other can reasonably stem.) You're right that, materialistically speaking, everything is in fact collections of particles. You lean on the particles to make a point about existence, but I think Bacchus or I can lean on the collections to speak meaningfully and accurately of those things around us.

[Bacchus]

I have a straight up empirical question to chemists -- is there a developed account of crystalline structures arising from interaction of individual Standard Model particles? I had a brief look a short while back and everything I came across modelled atoms as rigid bodies, which is of course no good at all. Has anyone managed to put a bunch of fermions and bosons into a simulation and get a crystal out?

[T-hawk]

What you don't have is any evidence that the non-physical doesn't exist.

Are you asking me to give evidence of absence, prove a negative?  That's like the most beginner logical fallacy there is.  See, I can be blunt and harsh too.

I'm also not dropping Occam's razor, it just didn't come up there.  Occam's razor is a heuristic that argues against your middle-ground solution.  Rather than that particles sometimes do and sometimes don't fully describe an organism's behavior, it's simpler to conclude that the particles go all the way all the time.  And I contend that the burden of evidence/proof is on the more complex solution.

That's just the same nonsense misusing Occam's razor. We could similarly say that intuition is another important heuristic, and it's simpler to conclude that intuition wins, and the burden of proof is on the less intuitive solution.

I'll assume you just keep repeating "misuse" for whatever you don't like because you have no better argument.  Intuition is a heuristic and so is simplicity.

So what just happens if you can get away with a grievous crime, if there are no societal consequences because no one knows about it?

Societal consequences have nothing to do with physical ontology.  You're trying to answer a debate of logic and reason with torches and pitchforks.  I decline to take that bait.  I don't care if you dislike the societal consequences.

T-Hawk, I haven't seen you answer a stronger point, which is that if you deny meaning of all higher-order things then language and logic don't have any meaning and your argument declares itself to be meaningless.

I don't need to.  If my argument is meaningless that way, then so is every other.

Here's another: you place so much weight on scientific evidence. Let's sharpen some point I've made, that in the picture humans  are mindless bags of cells: if scientists themselves are mindless bag of cells, then why should we retain the traditional trust in the scientific evidence, which after all (in the spirit of reductionism) can be reduced to hearsay?

Why should we even entertain scientific evidence in the first place?

It's possible that every scientist is fabricating the evidence.  I haven't run any particle experiments firsthand and can't disprove that.  But it is both simpler and more intuitive to conclude that the evidence is as presented rather than a product of some farfetched conspiracy theory.

[T-hawk]

Separating this out since it's the one relevant point out of all that which merits a substantial response:

And I mean complex in terms of first principles, not what you describe as the 'complex chemical cascade' that is only perceived as complex in deriving from so much aggregation of the simple laws.

I'm not convinced by this. What are your first principles, that there are particles that interact in certain fields?

My first principle is that there exists an objective reality which proceeds according to deterministic laws.  The particles and their exerted forces as the fundament of that reality are the best fit with current experimental evidence, enough so that I was using them as shorthand for that first principle.  The particles are not necessarily required; determinism holds even if field theory or something exotic like string or brane theory gives rise to the behavior that we currently describe as particles.

That position is a modification of where I was when we started the thread.  I hadn't considered the idea of top-down determinism as Bacchus introduced, or the idea of more-fundamental-than-particles, including THH's latest point about infinite subdividability.  I've refactored my principle to be compatible with each of those.  Determinism is the principle and particle materialism is the current best guess for its implementation.  I now see the distinction between those.

Determinism is supported by Occam's-razor simplicity; particle materialism is supported by experimental evidence.  You've been attacking my arguments the other way around, claiming that each lacks the other's avenue of support.  Now I've clearly separated those concerns.

[T-hawk]

As for why the idea is disturbing, it does not matter that I am not the one to be made a Genejack, but that I have empathy for the one who is (but he cannot feel what I am concerned about -- but he could have).

Would you feel that empathy for an electromechanical robot that exhibits the same functionality and responses as a Genejack?

2. Yes, the actions of a free will must be based on criteria. It must choose which values to uphold, as expressed in the particle fabric of our universe, choose which particle positions it prefers, based on the feedback those positions give it. Its criteria are opinions formed by the experience of this particle existence and perceptions of that existence -- so that it is not at all inconsistent with free will that the will make its choices under the influence of chemical factors, natural or not. In fact, it may be necessary in order for the will to be a will at all.

This position is sensible and consistent now.  You've come back to our concept of "unfree will", that a will might make choices but chemical factors may prevent effects of that choice from manifesting.

Nevertheless, I think my point stands in that its constituents are linked by gravity. But I think there's a bit of inconsistency in your statement -- you denied that there are similarities and linkages between particles, then established a similarity in position/proximity, a link in mutual gravitation, and similarities in temperature and temperature increase, and then said the similarities and linkages are arbitrarily selected. ... I think Bacchus or I can lean on the collections to speak meaningfully and accurately of those things around us.

The inconsistency is merely that I lapsed back into describing it in terms of human perception.  We may think a gradient between 9,999 and 10,000 K is negligible, but it's always possible to construct some kind of scenario where any such difference would have great causal power.  We may perceive two particles 1,400,000 km apart as gravitationally bound and having a similar effect in terms of yielding us energy from nuclear fusion, but what if they're part of two different-sized stars in close orbit and you're on a planet between them.  Yes, describing the collection is useful for human perception -- right up until the similarities of the collection break down somehow.

But more concretely, if you say, 'to argue the reality of a higher-order phenomenon, you need to define each threshold and edge case for what is included in the phenomenon,' don't you admit that if we did so, e.g., if we had a computer powerful enough to pinpoint every particle location, we could accurately and realistically describe higher-order phenomena?

You could, yes.  But any such description would be identical and equivalent to describing each particle individually.  If everything is so pinpointed, I would say all phenomena are of the same order.

I suspect that the pen I'm looking at doesn't experience the same falloff and mutability as the sun.

Sure it does.  The very act of looking at it is photons impacting to scatter electrons off its surface.  It just happens over a shorter distance that isn't readily perceivable at human scales.

[Huinesoron]

I have a straight up empirical question to chemists -- is there a developed account of crystalline structures arising from interaction of individual Standard Model particles? I had a brief look a short while back and everything I came across modelled atoms as rigid bodies, which is of course no good at all. Has anyone managed to put a bunch of fermions and bosons into a simulation and get a crystal out?

Hmm, good question. X-ray crystallography tends to work either on the 'rigid body' model (our x-ray diffractometer downstairs essentially treats a crystal as a set of diffraction grids), or an 'electron cloud' model (back in uni, I did a project with single-crystal x-ray crystallography; it feeds out a map of electron density in the unit cell). That second part hints at the answer: chemistry has never been about the nucleus. Any chemical structure, whether it's a crystal or a single molecule, is going to mostly be determined by the electrons and their energy levels.

So to what extent do you consider electron orbitals to fall under the Standard Model? If you think they fit, then yes, there are orbital-based models of crystals; my trigonal planar argentophilic crystal was mapped by the single crystal diffractometer as a bunch of orbitals. The same can also, nowadays, be said for individual molecules: AFM direct imaging of molecular bonds is undeniably cool. ^_^

hS

[Bacchus]

Well, the imaging and mapping is one thing -- does an orbital-based model result in crytal-like macroscopic behavior is what I was wondering. Is there a way that the mapping tells you: "yes, this bit of matter will now behave as a solid"

But actually the whole orbital point reminds one that 'particles' of the Standard Model aren't really even particles, they are distributions, i.e. patterns.

[ipecac]

Edit:

---

I wrote a long post in response to this, replying to every point you make in it. But I think it's unnecessary. You know your position invalidates itself, and you're refusing to face it. There's nothing more to be done in this respect.

T-Hawk, I haven't seen you answer a stronger point, which is that if you deny meaning of all higher-order things then language and logic don't have any meaning and your argument declares itself to be meaningless.

I don't need to. If my argument is meaningless that way, then so is every other.

That's a copout. Your choice of assumptions make your argument (and all others) meaningless, which disproves it.

You're avoiding this point.