Chairman Sheng-Ji Yang, Essays on Mind and Matter

[T-hawk]

I'm just referring to the apparent mechanics of practical reason. We look at a range of available actions, we identify reasons for pursuing those, we discard some reasons as bad, accept others as good, and proceed with the action accordingly. The fact that the process relies on some internalized conception of good and bad is just the point, to have that conception and act upon it is to have free will.

Yes, I misread what you meant as THH said, good or bad is any subjective definition, not necessarily moral. Of course I disagree with the last; there ultimately is no internalized conception of good and bad, just an aggregate of particle phenomena that interacts to produce the actions.

And I repeat again that never in this thread have I yet argued against determinism or materialism.

Right. You're so good at stepping into that position to express it better than I do that it strikes me more when you don't. I haven't done the converse (though I got there with your top-down ontology as we called it), perhaps partially because I'm less inclined to because my position so rigidly excludes anything else, but also perhaps because my position is simpler and easier to step into, while I'm still not quite sure exactly what ontology you hold. Are you looking for a way to reconcile free will with determinism or materialism or objectivism?

[Zed-F]

The quantum effects that are involved in and associated with consciousness are an active area of research. Quantum effects in microtubules (very important for neural structure) are particularly interesting, from this perspective. I'm not going to suggest there is anything definite yet, but you should not dismiss it cavalierly as "too big" -- this is not remotely true.

I don't necessarily have a problem with materialism, but I don't agree this implies determinism. The premise that you could build a model so accurate as to be able to replicate with 100% certainty what an individual is thinking based on 'knowing the particles', however you define that, seems impossible. Such a complicated model would inevitably succumb to chaos long before you could get that kind of certainty. So if nobody knows or can know the initial conditions, and chaos means you can't reliably come to any but the most general conclusions about how a particular subject will react when presented with a given open-ended stimulus in a given environment, can you really call that determinism in any meaningful way? Saying "the particles somehow came to a decision" without any way to replicate it or know what they will decide in advance is pretty useless. At that point you might as well call it free will -- you can't tell the difference.

If we ever do generate artificial general intelligence, we will never exactly replicate a person. The best we will be able to do is approximate. If we get good enough at it, that might well be close enough for all practical purposes, but it won't and can't be an exact match.

[Bacchus]

Are you looking for a way to reconcile free will with determinism or materialism or objectivism?

With materialism. I've been trying to show that there is no contradiction between accepting free will and believing that there is just one world, in which all higher-order facts supervene on lower-order facts or, in a more concrete formulation, if you 'fix' all physical facts, you also fix all chemical, biological, psychological, sociological and cosmological facts. ('Supervenience' is basically what the Morgan quote describes) This entails that to be a fact is to have some physical substrate. That's enough to get materialism. That by itself, however, does not entail that higher-order facts are subsumed in physical facts, or that physical facts are all there is to know. Supervenience is not sufficient for reduction (albeit it's necessary for it).

Determinism is just an ill-formulated notion as far as I'm concerned. As I take it, it seeks to answer the following question: "Does the complete set of current states of affairs uniquely fix all complete sets of future states of affairs obtaining at any point in time?" I don't think this question has any meaningful answer. At any point in time, only one complete set of states of affairs obtains, that's just definitional. This also means that we go, in an entirely fixed fashion, from one set to another. Does it mean that the future set is fixed by the current set? As far as I can see, you can answer yes, you can answer no, these answers have no real justification or consequence. So I'd rather say the question itself is ill-posed. 

As regards objectivism in your sense, taken together with materialism, it calls for a reduction to physical facts. I don't think such a reduction is workable, and I don't oppose materialism, so it's the objectivism in your sense that has to give. Thankfully, it appears pretty arbitrary even on its own.

The way you bring determinism into your picture is quite interesting. As I noted, objectivism and materialism are quite enough for a reduction. But how would we know they are wrong? Well, free will, on your definition, would mean that they are both wrong. And it would also make the world 'undetermined'. Which ultimately fuses the three together, and makes sense of your desire to define free will in just such a way that it couldn't exist without disproving your ontology. Kind of a jump to give falsifiability to your metaphysics, and make them empirical.

[darrelljs]

Note, I'm not reading anything but one post out of 50 in here, but that one I think I've read about before.

Just out of curiosity, are you favoring any particular contributors or viewpoints in what posts you read?

In case you were curious I'm only reading my posts .

Darrell

[TheHumanHydra]

As for why the idea is disturbing, it does not matter that I am not the one to be made a Genejack, but that I have empathy for the one who is (but he cannot feel what I am concerned about -- but he could have).

Would you feel that empathy for an electromechanical robot that exhibits the same functionality and responses as a Genejack?

2. Yes, the actions of a free will must be based on criteria. It must choose which values to uphold, as expressed in the particle fabric of our universe, choose which particle positions it prefers, based on the feedback those positions give it. Its criteria are opinions formed by the experience of this particle existence and perceptions of that existence -- so that it is not at all inconsistent with free will that the will make its choices under the influence of chemical factors, natural or not. In fact, it may be necessary in order for the will to be a will at all.

This position is sensible and consistent now.  You've come back to our concept of "unfree will", that a will might make choices but chemical factors may prevent effects of that choice from manifesting.

Nevertheless, I think my point stands in that its constituents are linked by gravity. But I think there's a bit of inconsistency in your statement -- you denied that there are similarities and linkages between particles, then established a similarity in position/proximity, a link in mutual gravitation, and similarities in temperature and temperature increase, and then said the similarities and linkages are arbitrarily selected. ... I think Bacchus or I can lean on the collections to speak meaningfully and accurately of those things around us.

The inconsistency is merely that I lapsed back into describing it in terms of human perception.  We may think a gradient between 9,999 and 10,000 K is negligible, but it's always possible to construct some kind of scenario where any such difference would have great causal power.  We may perceive two particles 1,400,000 km apart as gravitationally bound and having a similar effect in terms of yielding us energy from nuclear fusion, but what if they're part of two different-sized stars in close orbit and you're on a planet between them.  Yes, describing the collection is useful for human perception -- right up until the similarities of the collection break down somehow.

But more concretely, if you say, 'to argue the reality of a higher-order phenomenon, you need to define each threshold and edge case for what is included in the phenomenon,' don't you admit that if we did so, e.g., if we had a computer powerful enough to pinpoint every particle location, we could accurately and realistically describe higher-order phenomena?

You could, yes.  But any such description would be identical and equivalent to describing each particle individually.  If everything is so pinpointed, I would say all phenomena are of the same order.

I suspect that the pen I'm looking at doesn't experience the same falloff and mutability as the sun.

Sure it does.  The very act of looking at it is photons impacting to scatter electrons off its surface.  It just happens over a shorter distance that isn't readily perceivable at human scales.

All right, finally getting back around to this.

1. Would you feel that empathy for an electromechanical robot that exhibits the same functionality and responses as a Genejack?

No. But, erm, why are you arguing on the moral aspect of this subject? I hold strongly that morality (as an objective standard) is irrational without belief in a singular deity. If you wish to argue on moral grounds, then, you must submit your reasoning to the preferences of the divine, from whom we derive such ideas as the perversity of depriving other humans of the potential with which he vested them.

But I don't think you answered my query. Why not assign yourself different goals? There is no intrinsic value to creating a Genejack under your framework. The Genejack provides you the practical benefits of slavery, but not trying to force the issue promotes social unity, allows collective time and thought to be spent more efficiently, and likely averts violent conflict.


2. This position is sensible and consistent now.  You've come back to our concept of "unfree will", that a will might make choices but chemical factors may prevent effects of that choice from manifesting.

That's actually not quite what I was arguing. Bacchus restated the thrust of it yesterday -- 'random variations specifically lacking a reason would produce free noise, not free will.' Alternatively, will is preference. Preference requires feedback. Feedback requires a receptor. So will is consistent with physical feedback and a physical processor. Will is consistent with a particle existence.

It's a hypothesis. I do believe in a soul. But I'm not sure that the definition of free will you proposed way back is accurate.


3. The inconsistency is merely that I lapsed back into describing it in terms of human perception.  We may think a gradient between 9,999 and 10,000 K is negligible, but it's always possible to construct some kind of scenario where any such difference would have great causal power.  We may perceive two particles 1,400,000 km apart as gravitationally bound and having a similar effect in terms of yielding us energy from nuclear fusion, but what if they're part of two different-sized stars in close orbit and you're on a planet between them.  Yes, describing the collection is useful for human perception -- right up until the similarities of the collection break down somehow.

Sorry, I think I'm failing to follow -- you seemed to propose some aggregate concepts as relevant to our description of a particle grouping. In any case, we would accurately describe those two particles as part of a binary system. If we needed a word to describe only the solar matter in a binary system, we could come up with one, and it would reflect a reality. Whenever the similarities of a collection break down, we already have or can make a word to describe the realities of the level of granularity or the particular similarity we wish to discuss. They always reflect the real.

I grant you that our words are sometimes approximations. But that does not detract from that they describe real things.


4. You could, yes.  But any such description would be identical and equivalent to describing each particle individually.  If everything is so pinpointed, I would say all phenomena are of the same order.

I don't think it would be. I think you could ask the computer to describe for you all the particle constituents of a given object, and it would be able to do so -- but it would know what you meant when you mentioned the object.


5. Sure it does.  The very act of looking at it is photons impacting to scatter electrons off its surface.  It just happens over a shorter distance that isn't readily perceivable at human scales.

Hmm. I lack elementary scientific knowledge, but this seems intuitively wrong to me. Is my pen actually shrinking as I observe it? (Specifically, shrinking due to photon impacts, not other processes of decay?) Actually, regardless, you're right; all objects are mutable, because they undergo decay. But I think we know that when we say that the objects are, nevertheless, real and definable.

[TheHumanHydra]

Note, I'm not reading anything but one post out of 50 in here, but that one I think I've read about before.

Just out of curiosity, are you favoring any particular contributors or viewpoints in what posts you read?

In case you were curious I'm only reading my posts .

Darrell

 Hey, that Quote of the Month is looking a little stale. ... 

[Krill]

I don't understand intelligence, just stupidity, and I'm only reading the posts I can understand.

So Darrell's.

[shallow_thought]

Well, I've kind of caught up with the thread. It does cover a lot of ground, and I may have skimmed some of the recent exchanges - they definitely touch on some of the things I wanted to mention. I don't think I have much genuinely new to contribute, but I'll throw in what I have. Apologies if I'm revisiting old ground or not addressing the current subjects of interest (I had no intention of reading the Tractatus, but I did rather like the mesh analogy for scientific modelling, so perhaps I should make the attempt)

As far as I can tell, this thread started from analysing the position "Yang is basically right"; it rapidly focused particularly on two statements.

"My gift to industry is the genetically engineered worker, or Genejack. Specially designed for labor, the Genejack's muscles and nerves are ideal for his task, and the cerebral cortex has been atrophied so that he can desire nothing except to perform his duties. Tyranny, you say? How can you tyrannize someone who cannot feel pain?"

(raised by Fluffball as a potential counter-example, brutally thrown back by T-Hawk with a "the burden of proof is on you")

"Why do you insist that the human genetic code is "sacred" or "taboo"? It is a chemical process and nothing more. For that matter -we- are chemical processes and nothing more. If you deny yourself a useful tool simply because it reminds you uncomfortably of your mortality, you have uselessly and pointlessly crippled yourself."

(not explicitly quoted, but obviously related to the first one; I think this is the one at the root of the debate about materialism).

It then ran down various channels (I'm not personally hung up on the labels, but if I've chosen poorly and this hinders the discussion, feel free to object):
A) Can the universe be explained by purely scientific / material processes (this aligns strongly with Yang's second quote)?
B) If, so is a reductionist view (that the study, understanding and modelling of the universe at the smallest scales can be - at least theoretically - used to explain and derive the behaviour of the universe at larger scales) correct and appopriate?
C) Is there any such thing as "free will"?
D) Do the answers to (A) (B) and © have any implications for the "rightness" of Yang's position?

I got the impression that most of the discussion has been around A, B, and C, which is interesting as D is closer to the question that thread was actually set up to answer. This comes as no surprise - I've never seen any debate of this sort that didn't spiral off into new areas (not necessarily a bad thing).

Anyway, for what it's worth my answers are;
A) Yes.
B) No.
C) No, but is independent of A and B.
D) Maybe, but I lean towards "No".

I'll try and get my reasoning around this posted over the next few days so it can be pulled apart and stamped on for lurker entertainment .

[TheHumanHydra]

I'll try and get my reasoning around this posted over the next few days so it can be pulled apart and stamped on for lurker entertainment .

Looking forward to it.

But we all know the highest form of lurker entertainment would be for us to betray and rend each other like the rabid dogs we truly are.

[Bacchus]

Who needs Werewolf if you can throw your apparent ally under the bus philosophically?